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 The author claims that there is a growing need for governance, but not for 
world government.  Global governance is one of those terms which are 
increasingly familiar but for which it is hard to find a consensual definition.  Ne-
vertheless it is clear that it is not one thing but a hybrid, and that it is a process 
rather than an institution. This process is the attempt to identify issues, to form an 
agenda, to arrive at an outcome and to establish arrangements to implement it and 
gather feedback from that implementation. 
 After 500 years of the present global system we are moving towards a clearer, 
more conscious system of global governance to match the global economy. The 
present institutional frameworks for global governance are patently inadequate in 
these terms and their inadequacy is reflected in the growing alienation of indivi-
duals from democratic processes even in mature democracies, and from the insti-
tutions of the UN system. Global governance is multipolar in the sense that there 
are many different actors some of whom may be multi-national corporations, ot-
her non-governmental organisations or other international institutions as well as 
traditional state actors. 
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 The context 
 We live in an anarchical global society. Our society is anarchical because there is no 
central authority. Nevertheless, there is enough governance for it to constitute a society 
even if it is an extremely weak one whether at the inter-governmental level or in the 
context of global civil society. Moreover the situation is not uniform in that there is 
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much anarchy in political, cultural and social matters whereas a single world economy 
has grown out of the spread of capitalism, now almost to the furthest reaches of the 
globe. But even here there is still anarchy since that capitalism is governed largely by 
the market with its ebbs and flows, ups and downs and periodic crises. Nevertheless, 
there is a single global market and one which has some clear structural features such as 
a centre-periphery framework. Moreover, the growth of a single world economy has 
been a long process lasting for half a millennium.  
 It is important to realise that globalisation is not only an economic phenomenon; it 
also has implications for the viability of states. To be sure there are those who see the 
strength of the global economy, or at least the global market, as being such that states 
are like corks bobbing in the ocean formed by the global market. Others see the growth 
of regionalism as an attempt to create closed seas where the water is calmer and where 
governments and regional institutions can bring order to the ebbs and flows and the ups 
and downs. Indeed, it seems wise to view the phenomenon not as a matter of states ver-
sus markets, but of states and markets. Moreover, it is not only states that wish to bring 
order, so, too, do many of the other crucial actors in the process of globalisation. Indeed, 
at the human level there is always a propensity for order and stability even where the 
benefits of change are widely seized upon. 
 Over the last half century, and more particularly from about 1960, there has been a 
marked growth not only of globalisation but also of a wide range of global problems as 
opposed to world problems. Global problems are those from which no one can escape. 
We are therefore all necessarily involved. To give an example of this, consider the Sec-
ond World War which touched all continents but the effects of which would not neces-
sarily be known to or experienced, knowingly or unknowingly, by an indigenous person 
living deep in the Amazonian rainforest. However the same could not be said of some-
one living in the Amazonian rainforest in the case of a nuclear war, since whether this 
person realises it or not he or she would be influenced by nuclear fall out and by the 
prospect of nuclear winter. It was around 1960 that nuclear plenitude in the form of in-
ter-continental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads became plentiful to the two 
principal nuclear Powers of the day, the United States and the Soviet Union, likewise, 
the other early nuclear Powers were about to or had achieved that status, namely the 
UK, France, and a little later China.  
 It was also in 1960 that the OEEC became the OECD which signified the recovery 
of Europe and Japan from the vicissitudes of the Second World War. The Treaty of 
Rome had just been signed and the expansion of the world economy was gathering pace 
again. Moreover, despite the significant enclaves of the Soviet bloc and China, it was 
increasingly a global world economy which has extended dramatically over the last dec-
ade to incorporate those enclaves. The effects of this were clear to everyone when, for 
example, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan experienced a major financial crisis, 
whereupon there was an immediate impact upon my University since we were obliged 
to draw significant funds from our reserves in order to enable students from that part of 
the world to complete their degree courses, because they were unable to pay their fees 
or their living expenses.  
 It is, however, not only a question of the global economy. The effects of environ-
mental problems at the global level likewise are striking. We are all concerned about the 
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hole in the ozone layer or about the warming of the planet and the subsequent effects 
therefrom even though there may be considerable disagreement about the approach that 
should be taken to these problems. In short, it is clearly evident that there is a range of 
global problems which are different in kind from world problems. As these examples 
suggest, the fundamental difference is that there is no escape from their consequences 
and that in the last resort the only way that these problems can be broached is by hang-
ing together otherwise we shall surely hang separately.  
 There is thus a growing need for governance, but not for world government. Since 
there is a global society, even if it is anarchical, this also implies that there are shared 
values on which rules, procedures and institutions may be based which will enable the 
members to give substance to those shared values and, in particular, to enable them 
better to live together not only in dealing with global problems, such as those mentioned 
above, but also in order to take advantage of the opportunities that developments in 
global structures and processes present.  
 
 What is global governance? 
 Global governance is one of those terms which are increasingly familiar but for 
which it is hard to find a consensual definition. Nevertheless it is clear that it is not one 
thing but a hybrid, and that it is a process rather than an institution. This process is the 
attempt to identify issues, to form an agenda, to arrive at an outcome and to establish ar-
rangements to implement it and gather feedback from that implementation. Global gov-
ernance is multipolar in the sense that there are many different actors some of whom 
may be multi-national corporations, other non-governmental organisations or other in-
ternational institutions as well as traditional state actors. What is more these actors may 
operate at different levels, both formally and informally, and concern themselves with a 
wide range of questions be they political, economic, social or cultural as well, of course, 
as security issues. What global governance seems best fitted to broach are those global 
problems which necessarily concern everyone. In doing so this decentralised public 
process is related to global civil society in an inter-active manner. Thus, if it achieves its 
goal it is likely to produce norms, rules and decisions to manage global issues and the 
processes of globalisation from the local to the global in a form of multi-level govern-
ance. 
 If the notion of governance is hard to grasp we may nevertheless be able to exem-
plify it in the current state of integration in the European Union, which has a system of 
governance, but not yet a government. In the EU there is a four way process: this in-
volves building upwards to the joint management of pooled sovereignty, rather than 
federalism in a traditional sense; building down to effective regions in that all of the 
major countries in the EU now have either a federal or devolved political, economic, 
cultural and social systems; building across in the furthering of transnational ties, such 
as in the field of education; and increasingly, looking beyond the EU, for example in 
programmes for the Mediterranean and regular meetings, which are increasingly sub-
stantive, with organisations and Powers from different regions of the world. In this 
process a wide ranges of actors are involved, most aspects of human life are touched 
upon. Informal and formal processes have blended together on the basis of shared val-
ues, but without a constitution, within the framework of a number of treaties, starting 
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with the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the most recent one of which is the Treaty of Nice. 
Even though the current Convention may lead to a more formal institutionalisation and 
move in some ways towards a more conventional form of federalism, nevertheless the 
four way building process is likely to be the major thrust of the construction of this hy-
brid, which still has a strong element of governance as well as more formal government.  
 Governance is perhaps a belated response to the problems brought about by 
globalisation. Moreover, it is not only necessary to deal with the problems of globalisa-
tion but also to find an equitable manner in which to distribute the benefits of globalisa-
tion. It is perhaps a feeble attempt to broach the problems and potential opportunities of 
the 21st century with tools other than those of the 19th century or earlier. It is striking 
that many of our current political ideas are very old in their conception, be it liberalism, 
socialism, communism, capitalism and the like, or the two major 20th century additions 
to the list, fascism and globalism. Our dilemma is that our world is changing faster than 
our ability to conjure up new ‘isms’. Thus there is a gap between our toolbox and the 
problems with which we are confronted, not to speak of the advantages from which we 
may be able to take benefit. These notions of global governance are one attempt at an-
swering these problems and of devising ways of taking advantages of these opportunities. 
 
 How have we dealt with global governance in the past? 
 Michael Mann in his excellent volumes on The Bases of Social Power suggests that 
throughout human history societies have been formed on the bases of four sources of 
social power – ideology, economic power, military power and political power. While 
these sources of power overlap and interact, they do not form a fully integrated whole. 
Each is a means to attain human goals and each is a form of social control. From time to 
time one or the other will dominate and dictate the form of society at large, in other 
words, the form of global governance. But they are not organic parts of a single social 
totality. Since 1500, first in modern Europe and now all over the world, economic 
power, that is capitalism, has been the dominant basis of social power. We have had a 
world economy, albeit anarchically constituted, but without a world government, a 
world religion or world security. It may well be that this economic basis of power is be-
ginning to change to one which is more ideologically or identity based. But whether we 
stay with an economic basis of power or move to a more ideologically based source of 
social power, the framework is likely to be decentralised.  
 There is also a requirement for leadership and the long cycle theorists, such as 
George Modelski, have suggested that there have been five long cycles of political lead-
ership, each lasting about a century, which have been linked in with shorter economic 
cycles such as the Kondratieff cycles. Over the last five hundred years, century long cy-
cles have been led by Portugal, Holland, Britain (twice), and now the United States. The 
United States is in a peculiar position because, while it is the sole super Power since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, there are countervailing Powers in almost all of the di-
mensions which a super Power is likely to exercise its influence and political leadership 
in the process of global governance. To be sure, the United States is a colossal tradi-
tional military Power and far ahead of any other actual or potential rival. On the other 
hand, the threat to the United States is one that it finds very difficult to comprehend, 
namely the threat from terrorism. While it can bombard a regime causing its collapse, as 
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in Afghanistan and perhaps in the future in Baghdad, it cannot deal effectively with ter-
rorism since the nature of the threat is very different. Terrorism is effective because rich 
complex societies are open and vulnerable and if they begin to reduce their vulnerability 
by limiting their openness, they also thereby reduce their effectiveness and their pros-
perity is prejudiced. Moreover, the United States appears to be attacking the symptoms 
rather than the causes of terrorism.  
 These causes are many and complex but are influenced by a growing awareness of 
structural violence by peoples all over the world coupled with an obvious reluctance of 
those who benefit from this structural violence to promote change. For example, the 
demand for a New International Economic Order was summarily rejected by the firm 
refusal of President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher to take it seriously at the crucial confer-
ence in Cancun in the early 1980s. There is, in addition, a growing gap between the rich 
and the poor both at the global level as well as within some of the major centres such as 
the United States itself and the UK. There is also a denial of identity for ‘the other’ by 
those who rejoice in and embrace the triumphalism of a combination of liberal democ-
racy and capitalism. But if individuals and groups feel that their identity is denied then 
at the same time their very humanity is besmirched. In short, there is a strong sense of 
alienation and little has been done to reconnect those for whom the system has no ap-
parent benefit, but many obvious costs. But such people cannot be ignored because they 
have the means at their disposal to make themselves heard – and dramatically so.  
 On September 11, 1973, the United States government aided and abetted the Chilean 
military to overthrow the government of President Allende which was followed by a 
‘caravan of death’ in which 3,000 people were killed. On September 11, 2001, there was 
the dramatic attack on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington 
in which approximately 3,000 people were also killed. The first example shows the 
ability of a super Power to intervene elsewhere in the world whereas the second shows 
the vulnerability of a super Power to what were heretofore unconventional means of at-
tack. In fact, there has been a democratisation of access to effective forms of violence. 
Any determined group, which is willing to sacrifice a small number of its adherents, can 
wreak havoc in a highly complex interdependent, but vulnerable society if it is deter-
mined to do so. If the means of crushing such attackers are either too costly or ineffi-
cient, then there is a need to move from majoritarian decision-making to consensual de-
cision-making. This does not imply always giving way to the demands of those outside 
of the system but rather reforming it so that they have a stake within it, according to 
their own lights, which is also acceptable to those who are already well established and 
comfortable with the norms prevailing within the system. That such major changes are 
possible can be seen from the successful demolition of the Apartheid state in South Af-
rica and the creation of a ‘rainbow’ country, notwithstanding its blemishes. 
 Unfortunately it does not appear that the present United States administration is will-
ing to move in this direction. The United States has always, from its earliest days, culti-
vated a cultural norm of exceptionalism. General Washington warned his fellow citizens 
about getting involved in the political machinations of Europe and the Monroe doctrine 
was an attempt to preserve the pristine independence of the Americas from European 
interference. Because the United States feels itself to be exceptional it has great diffi-
culty in co-operating with other countries. Like the Chinese before them, the Americans 
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consider that they have nothing to gain from such co-operation, although they may have 
a duty to lead. While leadership can be based upon coercion, it is much more effective if 
it is the outcome of a consensus. Nevertheless, that consensus is difficult to achieve if 
one Power considers itself to be exceptional and the others do not necessarily share this 
appreciation. Even when the United States puts isolationism aside, its notion of interna-
tional co-operation is not of a truly multilateral nature and increasingly it is difficult for 
the United States to lead because it is unable, or indeed unwilling, perhaps even finding 
it unnecessary, to convince others that they should follow. Moreover, while the United 
States espouses wholeheartedly notions of liberty and equality in the context of a meri-
tocratic society, it has an extraordinarily weak conception of solidarity both within the 
country and with its allies. While it espouses notions of liberty and equality it does not 
aspire in the same way to the notion of fraternity, if we are to take the three pillars of the 
French revolution. It considers the basis of equality of opportunity, freedom for the in-
dividual and then a meritocratic society to be sufficient. But that is not enough for oth-
ers: they would add the key notion of solidarity or fraternity. Thus the United States has 
overwhelming military power in one sense, but its security is vulnerable in another 
sense and increasingly its leadership is being challenged.  
 In the economic sphere American leadership necessarily has to be conceived in the 
context of two other economic super Powers, namely, the EU and Japan. Moreover, 
there are other commanding cultures such as that of EU, China and India, not to men-
tion that of Islam, which in no way signify that we have arrived at the ‘end of history’. 
Moreover, it is not always evident that the American people are ready to pay the price 
of leadership when the threat cannot be obliterated from 15,000 feet and can manifest it-
self on their own doorsteps. This all suggests that leadership in the context of global 
governance is better conceived, not in the notion of a single super Power, but in the no-
tion of a collective leadership involving not only states but other actors as well. One 
element in this wider framework is the United Nations system and it is to that which I 
now turn.  
 
 The United Nations system 
 There are number of compelling reasons why a change in global leadership in the 
process of global governance will not be brought about through a major conflagration as 
has been the previously the case as Portugal gave way to Holland, Holland to Britain 
and, in a slightly different way, Britain to the United States. We are now dealing with 
global problems which affect everyone and therefore can only be met, or at least most 
efficiently be met, in a global manner. As we suggested above, we must hang together 
or we will hang separately. It should also be noted that we live in a world of complex 
interdependence and that everyone is sensitive to others in that a change in one major 
actor is likely to have repercussions for another. This is a lesson that the United States 
seems not to have learned, although it will be forced to acknowledge this the hard way 
when it becomes the recipient of the ‘knock on’ consequences. This may engender a re-
alisation that the promotion of community interest is an organic part of self-interest and 
here again there is a steep learning curve necessary for the Americans. If that learning 
curve proves to be too arduous then it is salutary to remember that every society has the 
capacity for suicide. However, the most likely outcome is a rough and ready consortium 
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of the United States, the European Union, Japan, China, Russia and India. In what way 
can the United Nations’ system help to provide a partial framework for this?  
 While the United Nations’ system is not the answer, it can be a part of an answer. 
Although the system is weak and inadequate in one way or another, all the major Pow-
ers are involved and thus the UN system does provide a partial framework. In security 
questions, the Security Council, and in particular the P5, is the kernel of a global secu-
rity system. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that India is missing, as is Japan, and the 
EU is only partially represented by Britain and France with Germany and Italy having 
but a tenuous, although an increasingly important role to play. In the longer term these 
difficulties may be taken care of by an EU seat as one of the permanent members. How-
ever, it should be noted that, having spent the last half century essentially concerned 
with its domestic affairs, the EU is now beginning to look beyond its boundaries and we 
can anticipate a more vigorous EU presence in global affairs, beyond the economic 
sphere where it already plays such a role.  
 Insofar as the economic sphere is concerned, the central organisations are partially 
within the UN framework, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and partially outside 
that framework such as the World Trade Organisation, G8 and OECD. The growing role 
of China in the WTO is helpful in this regard and to a certain degree the multinational 
corporations and banks have been drawn in through informal means such as the Davos 
meetings and more formally through the UN Secretary General’s Global Compact. 
 If, however, we turn to cultural and social questions, we find that there is a different 
framework. Sadly missing is a strong organisation for human rights. Human rights are 
given a prominent position in the UN Charter, notably in the preamble, and there has 
been over the years a growth of UN bodies concerned with human rights or related 
matters, such as the Human Rights Commission, the High Commission for Refugees 
and the World Food Programme. There has been at the same time a growing awareness 
of human rights in general, but equally of some of the inadequacies of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other Conventions and institutional frameworks. Arti-
cle 2.7 of the UN Charter no longer rides supreme in the way that it did in the past in 
that there is an acknowledgement of the tension between the universality of human 
rights and the notion of unbridled sovereignty in which the balance shifts between the 
two poles on particular issues. There is, however, no central framework, but while there 
is progress in the sense of the establishment of an International Criminal Court, on the 
other hand the United States is refusing to ratify its membership of that body and, in-
deed, is seeking actively to hinder its establishment.  
 Elsewhere a tripartite structure has emerged which has possibilities for governance 
despite the failure of ECOSOC to play any major role in this domain. On the one hand 
there are the UN Specialised Agencies which are concerned with functional questions 
and in which NGOs and others now play an increasing role, informally if not formally. 
The Specialised Agencies are concerned with individual segments such as health, la-
bour, scientific and cultural questions, agriculture and the like. To counter balance this 
segmentisation, the UNDP integrates the policies of the various Specialised Agencies in 
the context of a particular country or region thus bringing a much-needed holistic ele-
ment into the system. But perhaps the most important development is one that has been 
largely ignored as a systemic change, namely the advent of global conferences.  
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 The opening phrases of the UN Charter, ‘We the peoples…’ are, to put it mildly, 
economical with the truth. Nevertheless, civil society has entered the front door of the 
UN system through global conferences. These conferences have been an important de-
velopment over the last forty years in that they have added a new structural wing to the 
UN system and civil society has become central to such conferences. Themes such as 
the environment, human rights, population growth, resource depletion and the like are 
examined every five years or so through review conferences with major conferences 
perhaps every decade or two. This persistent pattern constitutes a structural element in 
the UN system as a totality. In such meetings the NGOs and MNCs play a major role. 
Although this is a significant change to the UN system, nevertheless it is important to 
bear in mind that only non-state actors in the Western model of civil society from 
OECD-type countries really participate in a full manner and thus the structural inequi-
ties between the centre and the periphery are perpetuated once again in the non-gov-
ernmental sector. Despite this the necessity for such conferences is not just an adminis-
trative need but also a means to broach global problems of the type we have evoked 
above. Some issues demand a form of global riot control, while others suggest more re-
sponsive, participatory, representative and transparent forms of governance. All, how-
ever, require a response and point to the need for new consensual non-majoritarian 
forms of global decision-making. Such forms need to be consensual and non-majori-
tarian because those excluded will, as we have seen above, have little incentive not to 
react destructively if they are excluded since then they have nothing to lose. Moreover, 
they have effective means of doing so, so that if we do not listen with one ear, our other 
ear will be tweaked – and uncomfortably so.  
 Thus we can say that the UN is moving in the right direction and forming a part of 
global governance, although there is far to go. In particular governance must be seen as 
a whole – at and across the global, regional and the local levels. Regions may be seen as 
a brake on globalisation and a facilitator of localisation, especially if there is a strong 
transactional base strengthened by a psychosocial community in a particular area. In-
deed, the UN Charter makes significant reference to regional organisations in many di-
mensions but most of these developments, including all that we have discussed above, 
are essentially ‘top down’ organisations rather than leading from the ‘bottom up’. 
Moreover, where do the people play a role in this framework of global governance? 
 The peoples’ agenda has been elucidated in part by the Gallup International survey 
of 57,000 adults in 60 countries in celebration of the millennium. The results show that 
people value health and family life above all else. They stress employment, living with-
out conflict and condemn endemic corruption. Human rights, the environment and de-
mocracy are high on the agenda. But a chilling finding is that even in mature democra-
cies, where elections are thought by the people to be fair, two thirds say that their coun-
try is not governed by the will of the people. 
 This agenda, arising from the Gallup survey, constitutes a set of navigation points 
for good governance at all levels. We ignore it at our peril. Yet authority and the legiti-
macy of governance is being challenged by alienation from the system even where there 
is ample opportunity for full formal participation. Such exclusion and alienation is a 
recipe for an unpeaceful world. The UN does little to ameliorate this. It is, as we have 
seen, a ‘top down’ system. Nevertheless, it has opened doors to wider participation of 
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elements of civil society and the satisfaction of basic needs globally is possible. More-
over the UN can help, the more so if it is able to enfranchise more actors, have more re-
sponsive processes and a great transparency. 
 
 Democratising the UN framework 
 There are many major problems that the UN system faces in seeking to play a role in 
the quest for global governance, but three stand out. The first concerns the enfranchise-
ment of all the relevant actors. We have seen how this has made some progress through 
the growth, in a systemic manner, of global conferences and the participation therein of 
a significant range of actors from global civil society. But this is not enough since many 
important actors do not fit the mould of participants in the UN system of global confer-
ences. In addition, there are many relevant actors who are, from the point of view of the 
system, deviant. But if problems are not only interstate or inter-governmental but also 
intra-state and transnational, then the relevant actors need to play a role in the system. 
 The second major problem is to find ways to release the tension between institu-
tional values and human needs. Human needs give rise to institutions but those institu-
tions quickly develop their own bureaucratic practices and institutional values, which 
may come, in the fullness of time, to frustrate human needs. The UN system is very bu-
reaucratic and institutionalised and so, too, are many governments and indeed, some 
NGOs. There is a crying need to get back to a situation in which human needs infuse the 
organisation and that it reflects changes in global civil society. At the moment only fit-
ful progress has been made in the UN system and all too often institutional needs pre-
vail over human needs. The criticisms of the IMF, in particular, arise from this tension 
between institutional and human needs. 
 Democracy has many forms, but within this framework there is usually a require-
ment for representivity of the constituency, a responsiveness to the perceived needs of 
the constituency, a sense of participation by all the actors from the local to the global 
level and a strong commitment to transparency. The present institutional frameworks for 
global governance are patently inadequate in these terms and their inadequacy is re-
flected in the growing alienation of individuals from democratic processes even in ma-
ture democracies ,as we saw in the Gallop survey, and from the institutions of the UN 
system. This alienation provides a modicum of tacit support, or at least indifference, to 
enable those who want to bring the system down to survive. There have been many pro-
posals for more direct democracy in the UN system, such as a second chamber which 
would reflect more directly the peoples’ wishes, but the system still seems alien to those 
in whose name it was founded, namely ‘We the peoples...’. 
 Our challenge is to give an appropriate expression to the opening words of the Char-
ter in an institutionalised political process of global governance for the 21st century. 
After 500 years of the present global system we are moving towards a clearer, more 
conscious system of global governance to match the global economy. However, we 
have not got much further than a recognition of the nature of the problem. No one can 
gainsay that we live in interesting times which, for the Chinese is a curse, but for us it is 
a challenge. 
